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THE IMPORTANCE OF OWNERSHJe 
Until recently, most mainstream economists tended to argue that 
ownership was relatively unimportant. For instance, Shonfield in his 
study of Modern Capifalfsm(l965) wrote: 
’ The most important discovery of the post-war period is that 
ownership 1s of itself much less important than either revolutionary 
proletarian or conservative bourgeois philosophy alleged’ (p.378). 
Economists were in general more concerned with market structures and the 
importance of competition in efficient resource allocation than with 
worrying about who owned what. However, with growing interest in free 
market economics, in the last few years ownership has become a subject 
ior study in its own right. The present Conservative Government clearly 
believes that changing ownership from the public to the private sector 
will bring about a major improvement in economic efficiency. This view 
has sprehd to other countries, notably the USA, France and Japan, where 
chunks of thelr public sectors are being prlvatlsed (Hemming and 
Mansoor, 19881, 
It is therefore worth reviewing why ownership might be important, What 
are the economic forces which could cause public enterprises to be less 
efficient than private enterprise ? Efficient in the sense of supplying 
any given output at least cost, what economists sometimes refer to as 
production efficiency. The other broad type of efffciency with which 
economists are concerned is allocative efficiency - allocating resources 
In society so as to maxlmlse social wellbelng - but this has featured 
much less prominently in the privatisation debate. 
The firm as a I bla ck box I 
The traditional approach to the firm IS to treat it as a ‘black box’ .’ 
which absorbs inputs and produces outputs. It Is this approach to the 
firm which dominates In most economics textbooks. The firm is 
essentially a converter of inputs into outputs In a mechanical and pre- 
determined fashion, with profit maximisation Included as an assumption. 
Thls assumption alongside given technical relationships between Inputs 
and outputs (the production function) means that the precise quantl ty 
of outputs produced is given. In part Icular there is no scope for 
managerial discretion. Moreover, the neoclassical economic models of 
competltlon and monopoly assume full production efficiency so that firms 
always choose the least cost combination of factors of production - 
land, labour and capital - to produce any given output. Instead of belng 
concerned with m to achieve produc tlon eff Iciency, such theor Ies 
concentrate upon the achievement of allocative efficiency, with prices 
related to marginal costs of supply as a necessary condition8 
Economists in the post-war period have expended much time and energy 




given varying ‘second best’ scenarios; and this styalised debate spilt 
over into the literature on public enterprises which became dominated 
by the search for ‘optimal’ pricing and investment rules. Consequently, 
the 1967 White Paper, (Nationalised Industries: A Review of Economic and 
Financial Objectives (Cmnd. 3437) endorsed marginal cost pricing and a 
‘test discount rate’ based upon the ‘social opportunity cost of capital’ 
for .public sector investments. However, such rules can only guarantee 
a .tielfare improvement if there is full production efficiency and 
production efficiency cannot be safely assumed, espec Ial ly in the 
pub1 ic set tor. 
Only from the early 1970s did much attention begin to focus upon the 
actual behaviour and performance of publicly owned firms. This new 
interest was associated with a more general interest in economics in 
investigating the utual operation of firms. The various theories 
spawned are now usually referred to in economics as ‘alternative’ or 
‘managerial’ theories, to dlst inguish them from the traditional, 
neoclassical models of cornpetit ion and monopoly. In these ’ alternative’ 
theories there is no presumption, as exists in the traditional theories, 
that firms maximise efficiency and pursue only profit. Indeed, it is 
recognised that ‘firms’, per se do nothing at all. Only individuals 
within firms make decisions, set objet t Ives and pursue them. The 
managerial theories therefore shifted the focus of economic enquiry to 
the Internal organisation of f lrms and, more specif lcally, to the 
behaviour and performance of management. 
3 
tie separation of o&ip and control 
We can trace the origins of ‘managerial’ theories of the firm to the 
ploneerlng work of Berle and Means (1932) on the separation of ownershlp 
and control in modern corporations and to Joseph Schumpeter’ s thesis 
(1950) that firms were becoming more bureaucratic. The central premise 
of these studies was that modern joint stock companies involve a divorce 
between the ownership and the control of assets. Shareholders own the 
assets of a company but management control their use. 
This separation of ownership and control is an example of an ‘agent- 
principal’ relationship, Agents, in this case management, are appointed 
by the principals, shareholders, to control the use of their resources. 
This relationship lies at the heart of the ‘managerial’ theories which 
incorporate the pursuit of non-profit maximising goals - such as sales, 
corporate growth or managerial utillty maximisation, as we1 1 as non- 
maximising behaviour, such as ‘satisficing’ I A main feature of these 
theories is the contention that management are capable of pursuing 
objectives which increase their own well-being rather than the well- 
being of shareholders. 
The abi 11 ty to pursue non-prof 1 t maximising goals is important to the , 
public vs. private debate. If information was perfect, then shareholders 
would be able to identify, and therefore prevent, non-profit maxlmislng 
behaviour I In reality, however, information is imperfect and the 
theoretical maximum prof 1 t wi 11 be unknown to shareholders. This, some 
economist have argued, permits management to achieve a ‘satisfactory’ 
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level of profit - one which keeps shareholders happy - while at the 
same time pursuing their own pecuniary and non-pecuniary goals, e.g. 
high management salaries and fringe benefits (economic rents) and ‘an 
easy life’. On the other hand, shareholder utility Is dependent upon 
profit because profit determines both the level of dividends (income 
from assets) and the share price (capital growth). Hence shareholders 
buy and sell shares according to their perception of current and future 
profitability and thls is directly a function of how well their assets 
are managed. If management lose the confidence of their shareholders, 
the company is likely to become a candidate for takeover by new 
management . Thus managers cannot ignore the interests of their 
shareholders and this establishes an important constraint upon non- 
profit maximising behaviour in the private sector. In addition, today 
management often has a direct interest in prof Its achieved because of 
the existence of performance bonuses, stock options and the like. 
This need not be interpeted as suggesting that private sector companies 
are always eff lcient. The capital market constraint is not entirely 
effective because shareholders lack perfect information. Management may 
be able to conceal lnef f iciency, especially if similar levels of 
lneff iciency exist in competitor firms. Also, the extent to which the 
’ takeover threat’ does constrain managerial discretionary behaviour is 
unclear. Studies of the operation of capital markets present a mixed 
pit ture. It is not always the inefficient that succomb to predator 
firms; while takeovers do not necessarily produce gains in efficiency 
(e.g. Singh, 1975; Meeks, 1977; Lawriwsky, 1984). Grossman and Hart 
(1980) suggest that the dispersed nature of shareholdings can act to 
thwart the takeover constraint upon management. Shareholders, even in 
the face of a declining share price, may hold on to their shares in the 
hope of benefittlng from a recovery in price. 
Nevertheless, the conclusion remains that the principal-agent 
relationship in the private sector limits non-profit behaviour by 
management , Management in public joint stock companies, the main 
private sector alternative to nationalised industries, may pursue their 
own pecuniary and non-pecuniary goals, but such activity is constrained, 
If not eliminated, by the existence of the competitive capital market. 
Thus the ‘managerial’ theories in economics, developed initially in 
terms of private sector companies, would appear to be more apposlte 
where there is no competitive capital market. In other words, they would 
appear to apply best to the public sector where not only is there no 
takeover threat but the principal-agent relationship is highly 
fragmented. 
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Anents. principals and state ownership 
Paralleling the existence of the manager - shareholder relationship in 
the private sector is the division in the public sector between the 
departments of state, ‘quangos’, boards of state enterprises, which 
manage assets on behalf of the public, and the public, which (at least 
in principle) own the assets. Intervening between managers as agents and 
the public as principals are layers of control involving civil servants, 
government ministers and MPs. Therefore, the agency relationship in the 
pub1 ic set tor is far more intricate than in the private sector. This 
slmpler agency relationship in the private sector adds weight to the 
argument that privatisation raises eff lclency. The difference in the 
agency relationship in the private and public sectors is summar lsed in 
Figure 1. 
(Figure 1 here). 
In UK nationalised industries there is a series of agents or sub-agents 
between the public and boards of management. This complicated agency 
structure between the public as principals and board management as 
ultimate agents increases the probabili ty that management will pursue 
their own goals at the expense of efficiency. 
Managerial behaviour and objectives in state enterprises can be expected 
to differ from the goals the public supports because of ‘noise’ in the 
lnformatlon flow from principals through sub-agents to the decision 
takers. The wishes of the public are distorted or even ignored because 
of the lack of an effective channel of communication. Each level in the 
agency structure can be expected to introduce its own interpretation of 
th ‘public interest’; while the ballot box, writing to MPs and oplnlon 
poL‘ls are only likely, at best, to be partially effective in llmltlng 
the actions of agents. Moreover, the government and boards keep the 
public inadequately informed to judge the true performance of their 
industr les; and individual members of the public are unlikely to invest 
the time and effort necessary to overcome bureaucratic misinformation. 
The saving to the single taxpayer from higher efficiency is relatively 
small, while trades unions and other special interests have more to gain 
from lobbying MPs, government and boards, and by concentrating pressure, 
are likely to be more effective; especially when MPs are sponsored by 
public sector unions. State industries and thelr regulators, therefore, 
are under constant threat of ‘capture’ by interest groups. 
It does not follow, of course, that the public will necessarily want 
state enterprises to maximise profit above all else. For example, the 
public may wish to see price rises suppressed or loss making plants kept 
open to preserve jobs, But the important point is that the existence of 
such goals in the public sector weakens the monitoring of agents. It 
becomes convenient for politicians, civil servants and public boards to 
conceal lnefflciency by appealing to a vague notion of ‘the wider public 
interest’. The ‘public choice literature on government fal lure 
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(Mitchell, 1988) stands in stark contrast to the earlier Weberlan model 
of bureaucracy in which disinterested bureaucrats can be relied upon to 
pursue the ‘public interest’. 
The failure of public enterprises to rationalise and transform their 
f lnances, e.g. British Rail traditionally and Brltlsh Steel in the 
197Os, alongside evidence of private sector firms taklng tough decisions 
to reverse losses in trade downturns (Redwood, 19841, is a consequence 
of the different agent-principal relationships in the public and private 
set tors. In the 1980s the performance of state industries has improved 
dramat lcally in the UK (Treasury, 1987>, but this has resulted it seems 
from the government’s determination to inject new management and 
commercial objectives. In other words, it has made the state industries 
operate u if thev were private sector companies, The government ’ s 
resolve to maintain a commercial goal has no doubt been bolstered by Its 
desire to privatise the industries. Earlier governments lacking the same 
resolve were quickly side-tracked into using nationalised industries to 
meet macro-economic object Ives. 
The deficiencies of the Morrisonian public corporation in the UK derive 
from the agent-principal relatlonship; a relationship paralleled in 
other forms of ‘public ownership’ - government departments, agencies and 
” quangos’ and local authority control. In the case of local authority 
services, the public remain ultimate financiers of trading deficits, 
through local taxation, and face tiers of local rather than central 
agents, including the local political machinery, This begs an obvious 
question - is local bureaucracy likely to be more representative and 
accountable than national bureaucracy? Only if the answer is yes can we 
safely presume that a move from centrally to locally controlled state 
enterprises, favoured by some Labour activists, will improve operatlng 
efficiency. Currently, there appears to be no evidence to support this 
view, 
: role of the Product market 
So far we have been primarily concerned with the agency relat lonsh ip in 
the public and private set tors. But the enthusiasm of government 
ministers for privatisation derives also from faith in the role of 
competition. Economic theory suggests that where there is considerable 
competition in product markets, firms must sell at the going market 
price or close down, If a firm is inefficient, its costs of production 
will be higher than those of 1 ts competitors and 1 t will not survive. 
Therefore, competition places a severe limitation upon the ability of 
management and workers in the public and private sectors to pursue their 
own goals which ralse production costs. In other words, competl tlon in 
the product market acts as an important additional constraint alongside 
the capital market upon non-profit maximising behaviour in firms. 
The importance of the product market is underlined by recent studies of 
public vs. private efficiency which conclude that there is no clear 
pattern of private sector superiority in industries where product market 
competition is limited, such as electricity and water (see e.g. Mlllward 
and Parker, 1983), This suggests that in the private sector a lack of 
10 
competition enables management both to satisfy shareholders and pursue 
their own goals, including an ‘easy life’, by the simple expediency of 
raising prices to consumers. Equally, it implies that in the public 
sector we should expect firms facing competition to be more efficient 
than state monopolies. This follows since monopoly helps to protect hlgh 
costs, inefficiency, rent seeking and political over commercial 
ob j ec t.1 ves . 
Also, because monopo ly facilitates discret ionary behaviour by agents, we 
should expect state enterprises to be associated with artificial 
monopolies, and this is the case. In bus and rail transport, coal 
mining, gas and electricity supply, telecommunications and so on, in the 
post-war period ‘public enterprises’ were given statutory monopolles. 
Only on privatisation has some effective competition been injected into 
sleepy state monopolies; though arguably this has not gone far enough, 
especially in the cases of telecommunlcatlons and gas. Moreover an early 
opening up of coal supplies to full competition would probably do much 
more than the endless directives, enqulrles and White Papers since the 
195Os, to reverse the low productivity and capital write-offs which have 
plagued this industry. 
The failure to inject more competition in telecommunications and gas 
(and to a lesser extent in electricity) on privatisation is itself a 
manifestation of the power bull t up by managements and trades unions in 
the public sector since nationalisation. The continuation of monopoly 
status reflects the success of incumbent managment in preserving their 
’ freedom to manage’ and the associated economic rents. A result 
. . 
compounded by a government keen to privatise speedily and without 
adequate attention to the source of efficiency gains. Distinguishing 
clearly between the product and capital markets helps to clarify the 
strengths and weaknesses of any privatisation measure. To raise 
prod,uction efficiency appreciably requires not only a change in the 
cap1 ta1 constraint facing firms, and hence in the agent-principal 
relationship, but the existence of effective competition in the product 
market (Figure 2). 
( FiqUFI 2 lccc ) 
Conclusion 
The increased lnterest in the last two decades or so in the internal 
organisation of firms, and principally the behaviour and performance of 
management, has played an important part in the reassessment of the 
relative merits of private and state ownership. 
It is the existence of tiers of agents in the public sector, alongside 
the lmposl t ion of statutory monopo 1 y powers which leads to the 
expectat ion that state ownership is less efficient than pr lvate 
ownership. The different agency relatlonships in the two sectors means a , 
different capital market constraint upon managerial behaviour, At the 
same time, monopoly power enables agents in the state sector to pursue 
discretionary goals without loss of market to more efficient private 
set tor compet i tors. Thus while privatisation simplifies the agency 
relationshlp, large efficiency gains are likely to be associated with 
opening-up former state monopolies to effective competition. 
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Figure 1 
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Yes * Yes 
No Yes 
* However, the private monopolist may be able to satisfy 
shareholders by raising prices so that consumers not owners bear the 
costs of managerial discretionary behaviour. 
